BRITAIN IN PALESTINE 

This section, updated montly, gathers historical evidence in the form of excerpts and transcripts on Parliamentary actions involving Palestine.

 

 

 

 

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

​

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

​

​

​

​

​

​

Yesteryear in Parliament

 

From a House of Lords debate on 20 July 1937 on the report of the Peel 

Commission which, among other things, recommended partitioning 

Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab one, at a time when, even after 

intensive immigration of European Jews, the population was still more 

than 60% Arab.

 

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP of CANTERBURY, Cosmo Gordon Lang:

I have such a natural, deep, abiding interest in the Holy Land that I feel I cannot 

be altogether silent.  I have been gradually driven to the conclusion that the 

Balfour Declaration, accepted and embodied in the Mandate of 1922, with its 

double obligation, has imposed upon the administration of Palestine an insoluble problem and an impossible task.

 

We used to think that Mr. Balfour, as we always like to call him, made that 

Declaration as a stroke of war policy in order to secure at a critical time certain 

invaluable financial securities for this country. We have since learnt in the 

admirable biography of his niece that at least twelve or thirteen years before, Dr. Weizmann, then a young lecturer in chemistry in the University of Manchester, had already inspired Mr. Balfour with the Zionist ideal. When the War came Mr. Balfour appeared to be ready to use it as an opportunity for endeavouring to fulfil these ideals. It has always seemed strange to me that a man of his most acute intelligence should not have foreseen the almost inevitable difficulties which that Declaration, with its double obligation, would impose. The origin of all the difficulties, as it has seemed to me, following this matter for all these years, has been the original ambiguity in the term "a National Home"—a wholly new term, so far as I know, in diplomacy or international relations. What did it mean? Was it a National Home for the Jews within Palestine, or was it that Palestine was to be itself a National Home for the Jews; or was it to be, as Mr. Lloyd George, who was then Prime Minister, seemed to think, a Home of which itcould be said that if the Jews became a definite majority then Palestine would become a Jewish Commonwealth? It was this uncertainty which seems to have underlain all the declarations and documents during the course of the experiment.

 

The result was, of course, that when an interpretation was made which seemed 

to favour the Arabs it was followed by another interpretation which seemed to 

favour the Jews and vice versa, until we had the position created in 1930 by the 

famous White Paper, immediately followed by what the Arabs called the "Black 

Letter" addressed by the Prime Minister to Dr. Weizmann. Naturally, the result 

was that wherever there was any qualification of the Jewish claims it gave 

offence to the Jews, whenever there was any allusion to a Jewish State it gave 

offence to the Arabs. There were two reasons, I suppose, which led to the 

increasing Arab hostility… The first reason was, of course, the sudden and, to 

them, alarming increase of immigration which followed 1933. Thus in 1935 the 

number of Jewish emigrants rose from 9,500to 61,854. The whole Jewish 

population thus rose to 400,000, whereas only fifteen years before it had been 

only 65,000 in a population of 600,00o Arabs. Was it to be wondered at that the 

Arabs asked themselves: "Whither is all this tending? Are we not drawing near 

the time when the Jewish National Home will mean that Palestine itself is to 

become a Jewish State?"

 

…Is there any escape, then, from the conclusion—I do not think any one can 

seriously escape from it—that a deadlock has arisen which cannot be terminated by the continuance of the existing Mandate? …Th[e] way out has been indicated by the unanimous conclusion of this very able Commission. It is partition. … The noble Viscount's other alternative is this beautiful conception of a great Arab Federal State. I do not know what position Palestine would have within it, but he afterwards pointed out that all the self-government that would be given would be an Advisory Council in which both communities would have a place. I would be very greatly surprised if the Arabs would look at the creation of such an Advisory Council as any sort of fulfilment of, as they think, their legitimate aspirations to independence…”

 

 

 

 

 

 

House of Commons, 14th June, 1921

Winston Churchill, British minister for the colonies, reassured Parliament that the Arabs of Palestine had nothing to fear from Zionist claims on Palestine.

 

WINSTON CHURCHILL: The difficulty about this promise of a national home for the Jew in Palestine [the Balfour Declaration] is that it conflicts with our regular policy of consulting the wishes of the people in the mandated territories and of giving them representative institutions as soon as they are fit for them, which institution, in this case they would use to veto any further Jewish immigration. There are many difficulties, but, numerous as they are, vexatious as they are, I believe that with patience, coolness, and a little good fortune we may find a way out of them. The British Empire has been built up by optimism and by positive assertions rather than negations. There are in Palestine about 500,000 Moslems, 65,000 Christians, and about 63,000 Jews. There have been brought into Palestine under the Zionist scheme of immigration about 7,000 Jews. This immigration and the propaganda by which it has been accompanied has greatly alarmed and excited the Arab population. It is not so much the number of the immigrants which has created the alarm, but the continuous and ardent declarations of the Zionist organisations throughout the world—which they have a perfect right to make—of their hope and aim of making Palestine a predominantly Jewish country, peopled by Jews from all over the world, and also the fear that these Jews will come principally from Central Europe, and particularly from Russia.

The Arabs believe that in the next few years they are going to be swamped by scores of thousands of immigrants from Central Europe, who will push them off the land, eat up the scanty substance of the country and eventually gain absolute control of its institutions and destinies. As a matter of fact these fears are illusory. The Zionists in order to obtain the enthusiasm and the support which they require are bound to state their case with the fullest ardour, conviction and hope, and it is these declarations which alarm the Arabs, and not the actual dimensions of the immigration which has taken place or can take place in practice. However, we have there Sir Herbert Samuel, who is so well known to many Members of this House; a skilful, practised, experienced liberal politician—qualities of which it is very necessary to have an ample supply in the government of so widespread and various an empire as ours. He is also a most ardent Zionist. I am following with very great confidence his action and giving him every possible measure of confidence and support in these difficult times. He has lately made a further declaration to the peoples of Palestine, explaining to them his interpretation of the phrase "national home," as used in the pledge given by the British Government in 1917. This is what he said: “These words (national home) mean that the Jews, who are a people scattered throughout the world, but whose hearts are always turning to Palestine, should he enabled to found here their home, and that some amongst them, within the limits fixed by numbers and the interests of the present population, should come to Palestine in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop the country to the advantage of all its inhabitants.” There really is nothing for the Arabs to be frightened about.

 

1923 - 'Cancel the Palestine mandate" – Lord Islington

 

When the English journalist J. M. N. Jeffries (and later author of Palestine: The Reality) published copies of the pertinent portions of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence in the Daily Mail in 1923, it caused such a public uproar that Lord Islington officially moved that:

 

"The Mandate for Palestine in its present form is unacceptable to this House because it directly violates the pledges made by His Majesty's Government to the people of Palestine in the declaration of October, 1915 (in the McMahon correspondence), and again in the Declaration of 9 November 1918 and is, as at present framed, opposed to the sentiments and to the wishes of the great majority of the people of Palestine: that therefore its acceptance by the League of Nations should be postponed until such modifications have been affected therein as will comply with the pledges given by His Majesty's Government."

 

The British government refused to publish the complete Hussein-MacMahon correspondence in response to Lord Islington's challenge. The passage of the motion to repudiate the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate led to no action.

 

 

 

Debates on Palestine in the British parliament during the period of the Mandate show how, in spite of Zionist pressure and support, there were plenty of M.P.’s and peers who could see the harm that was being done to Palestine by the imposition of the Balfour Declaration on the inhabitants.

 

Debate on the League of Nations in House of Lords on 22nd July, 1920

 

LORD LAMINGTON: “…it is specially desirable in our own interests that when we accept Mandates they should have the approval of every nation that adheres to the League. For my own part I may say I think this particularly applies to 

Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine. So far as I can see there has been a complete disregard of Paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant. Paragraph 4 distinctly asserts that the wishes of the people who are put under a Mandatory Power should be first ascertained. So far as I am aware, that has not been done in any one of those three countries.”

 

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON:  “…my noble friend Lord Lamington, who draws attention to paragraph 4 of Article 22—to the very important consideration that the wishes of the communities concerned must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. Of course that is so, and it is upon that principle that we have been acting in the case of Mesopotamia and of Palestine. … And I declare that no evidence of any sort can be adduced that the inhabitants, either of Mesopotamia or of Palestine, wish for any other Mandatory than ourselves. During the last two or three years we have been making the most earnest and continuous efforts to arrive at what is in the real mind of the people of Mesopotamia. We are anxious to meet them in every possible way. We are pledged there to set up some form of Arab Government. The form that we desire is the form which is acceptable to the people. The difficulty we have found has not been for one moment that they dislike the idea of our Mandate, but they cannot make up their own minds what is the particular form of independence that they want. You have there a great territory from Mosul in the North down to Basra and the Persian Gulf in the south; you have Kurds in the mountains in the extreme north; you have nomad Arabs in the south; you have the city population of Baghdad in the middle; and the commercial community of Basra in the south.

 

You can well understand that there is some difficulty in procuring unity among all those people. But that is our desire. And certainly against no nation or Government concerned can the reproach be made with less justice, that we have not made a principal consideration, in the choice of the Mandatory, the wishes of the communities themselves.”

 

[N.B. THERE IS NO REFERENCE IN LORD CURZON’S REPLY TO CONSULTING THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PALESTINE, ONLY IRAQ.  AND OF COURSE, NOT WISHING FOR ANY OTHER MANDATORY THAN BRITAIN DOESN’T MEAN THAT THEY WANT A MANDATORY AT ALL.]